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SPEECH  COMMISSIONER  ANDRIESSEN  HELD  ON 
NOVEMBER  6,  1981  IN  WASHINGTON  D.C.,  BEFORE 
.  ..  '  T"-. 
THE  AMERICAN  BAR  ASSOCIATION'S  NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE  ON  ANTITRUST 
Antitrust in the International Sphere 
Antitrust - an  Endangered  Species? 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen: 
I  am  very honoured  to speak  to you  today. 
Since  I  took  up  my  functions  as  Commissioner  responsible. for 
Competition Policy in the European  Community  early this year, 
I  have  sometimes felt that there is an  analogy  between antitrust 
and  the Bengal  tiger.  I  really ought to  speak  to you  on 
"Antitrust as  an Endangered  Species". 
The  analogy between  the  Bengal  tiger and antitrust is greater 
than  you  think.  They  both  seem  threatened with extinction and  in 
great need  of protection of  - at least as  far  as  the Bengal 
tiger is concerned  - the \Jorld Wildlife Fund.  I  sometimes  wonder 
what  and whose  protection we  need  in the field of antitrust.  I 
think that at least in Europe it is often a  question of political 
willingness,  especially in a  period of  economic  recession,  but 
I  will come  back to this later. 
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Before addressing myself  to  the international side,  I  will recall 
some  of the objectives of  EEC  antitrust policy.  The  internal~ 
national objectives of antitrust policy play an  important 
role in our  international trading relations.  They  must 
ascertain that the  t~riff and non-tariff barriers,  which have 
gradually been abolished as  a  result of our  commercial  policy, 
will not be  replaced by  private agreements or  prac~ices of 
corporations or,  indeed,  Member  States which would distort 
competition,  maintain the separation between national markets 
inside the Community,  or which would shelter the Community  against 
foreign competition.  This role is distinct,  ho\'rever,  from  the 
role which antitrust plays inside any  given national market. 
The  competition rules of  the Treaties of Paris and  Rome  and of 
the free trade agreements  concluded  between  the  EEC  and various 
third countries would  become  a  dead letter if the  hard-won 
tariff freedoms  would be reduced to nothing  by cartels or by 
state aids. 
The  institution of a  system ensuring that competition in the 
Common  Market is not distorted is one  (and  only  one)  of the 
• 
•  struments of  \o~hich  the Community  disposes  under  the Treaty 
c-f  Rome  in order to fulfill the main  purpose set by  the Treaty, 
i.e.  to promote  the  harmonious  development of economic activities 
throughout  the domrnunity  by  the establishment of a  Common  Market • 
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3. 
It is essential for  the European  Community  to remain open 
. 
towards  world markets.  Essential for  the enhancement of the  sound 
economic  development of the European  Common  Market and for the 
maintenance of adequate competitive capacity. 
As  a  net industrial exporter and as one who  is compelled to 
remain  so because of·its insufficient resources,  the EEC  can 
only  take up  the  terms  and  challenges presented by  the "outside" 
world • 
This  basic philosophy is also borne out by  the fundamental 
principles which govern  the European  Community's  competition  . 
policy.  This policy must contribute  t~ a  truly unified and  open 
common  market,  which  ensures  that competition.will not be 
distorted. 
The  establishment and maintenance of a  unified market presuppose. 
that inside this market  any  agreement or practice which  leads, 
directly or indirectly,  to market partitioning or to different 
prices or trading conditions  betwe.en  national markets  is 
prohibited. 
The  European.community is still quite young,  of course,  and  that 
it suffers from  growth  pains cannot be denied.  But  I  think that 
even  the very :.first qecision which  the Commission  ever adopted 
under art.  85  of the EEC-T:reaty  bears out our concern  '~hen it 
comes  to free trade with non-EEC  countries.  The  question which 
was  before the Commission  .in  this first decision -· and  I  am 
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talking  o£  1964  only  - was  whether  a  prohibition to export goods 
into the Common  Market: which was  imposed  on  a  ·swiss corporation 
could be .attacked under  the EEC  competition rules.  In  ~ts 
decision,  the Commission held that the export prohibition would 
be  incompatible with the  EEC  rules if the prohibition would 
result in a  restriction of competition inside the Common  Market 
and if it would affect trade between Member  States.  (In fact, 
the  Commission decided that this was  not the case,  given the  ·· · 
•  level of the customs  tariff \'lhich  existed at the  time  for the 
product concerned.) 
·'  ..  . 
This  jurisprudence has  been reconfirmed in many  later decisions,  ..  ,.,... 
If  as  well as in the Commission's  1972  Communication on voluntary 
restraint agreements with Japan: ·in principle,  such self-restraint 
agreements fall under art.  85,  unless the agreements  only  implement 
official trade accords or unless  the agreements  have  been  imposed 
by  a  government on its nationals under  the country's commercial 
policy.  The  Commission  deems  in fact that any protective 
measures which might be necessary for a  limited period of time 
fall within the context of commercial policy and that it is 
therefore not up  to business  to substitute itself for  the 
pe'1lic authorities in this domain.  Thus,  an unofficial 
p  ~allelism between certain commercial  policy objectives  and 
private restraints of  trade is not  enough  to claim immunity 
•  from  the Community's antitrust provisions. 
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A few  further points merit special mention here.  These  concern 
in particular the non-discriminatory  treatment of all 
corporations operating inside the Common  Market.  The  maintenance 
of an open  Common  Market demands  that all market participants 
are required to observe its rules~  This basic principle has  .  ' 
been expressed in a  great number  of Commission  decisions and 
has  been confirmed by  many  judgments of the Court of Justice 
of the European  Communities.  The  determining test in  t~is 
context is the effect which  the agreements  or the behaviour 
have  on competition inside the Common  Market  and  on  trade 
between M~er States.  Any  significant interference with the 
reallocation of productive factors within the Common  Market  by 
restrictive agreements  comes  under  the competition rules, 
irrespective of the place where  the interference originates  from. 
In applying  this effects doctrine,  which all of you are 
familiar with in this country,  the European  Commission acts in 
line with the practice of most free market countries  and also, 
I  believe,  in accordance with international law. 
As  to the principles whichthe u.s.  and  EEC  authorities apply in 
assessing  the effects on  competition,  they  seem  largely 
identical.  If Bill H.R.  2326,  the Foreign Trade Anti+Trust 
ImprovementsAct, is to make  clear that the prohibition of the 
•  Sherman  Act does  not apply unless  the conduct  involving  trade 
with any  foreign nation has  a  direct and  substantial effect on 
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trade  or commerce  within the u.s.,  then  I  can only welcome  the 
coincidence of views  in the approach of this  fundamental 
problem of subject matter  jurisdiction. 
In distinguishing substance  from  procedure,  I  admit that the 
exercise of jurisdiction may  create difficulties.  So  far, 
these difficulties have  been solved for most of the multi-
national corporations which  do  business  inside the Community  and 
which  operat~ through local subsidiaries:  in these cases  the 
parent and subsidiary corporations are regarded as  one  single 
entity for  the purpose of establishing jurisdiction.  The 
European  Court of Justice has  supported this approach as far 
back  as  in the Dyestuffs  cases in 197.2.  (The  activities of the 
subsidiary may  be  imputed to the parent,  or in case where  the 
subsidiary directly implements  head office instructions or policy, 
its activites are regarded as  those of  the parent acting directly 
through the subsidiary). 
I  am  aware,  of course,  of the  fact. that problems may  also arise 
with respect to  discovery~  the ga'thering of data,  the service of 
process and  communication of decisions  abroad.  These  problems 
'  .y  be accentuated if.a country prohibits  a  corporation within 
its jurisdiction from  furnishing  information to the 
authorities of another country.  In cases where  the subject 
matter  jurisdiction of the intervening foreign authority is 
beyond question,  no  country should make  it possible 
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for a  corporation located in its territory to escape that 
jurisdiction by prohibiting the submission of information  • 
.  In carrying this a  little further,  I  can only agree with what 
Donald Turner recently said in a  speech,  i.e. that'there is 
simply  no  persuasive basis under  the rule of non-interference 
(or comity)  for  concluding that one state has  a  legal duty  to 
give way  completely to the other;  or by  the  same  token,  that 
one state would  be  c~mpelled to abandon ·control 
over  conduct within its jurisdiction which·runs  counter  to its 
laws  and its interests. 
Wouldn't it seem presumptous if the Governinent of West-Germany, 
e.g.  were  to try to preclude the u.s.  Government  from investigating 
Volkswagen's practices in the  USA  ,  simply on  the ground that 
these pDactices are similar or identical to Volkswagen's  European 
practices which the German  authorities may  or may  not 
investigate? Most of you here would,  in my  view,  reply in the 
affirmative. 
This,  in my  opinion,  underscores  the necessity of ·cooperation 
between countries concerning restrictive business practices 
which affect international trade.  On  the  one  hand,  many  of 
these :practices are beyond  the powers  of control of national 
antitrust authorities and  indeed  the national courts.  On  the 
other hand,  investigations into certain business practices 
and proceedings  by  some  antitrust authorities may  in given cases 
'affect important interests of other countries.  Antitrust 
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authorities  should therefore cooperate when  it comes  to the 
implementation of their respective legislation and policies. 
I  believe that the  Recommendations of the  OECD  Council of 
September  1979  constitute a  valuable instrument in dealing  :·.'.'. 
effectively with restrictive business practices which  have  a 
harmful effect on international trade. 
Before  terminating  I  would like to draw your attention to a 
couple of problem areas which  I  am  currently dealing with. 
Much  of my  time in Brussels is taken  up  by  state subsidies. 
The  EEC  Treaty  de~lares any  subsidy granted by  a  Member  State 
to  be  incompatible with the Common  Market if it distorts or 
threatensto distort competition by  favouring  certain corporations 
or  the production of certain goods.  I  will not say more  than 
that the Commission's policy is aimed at the prevention of a 
proliferation of state subsidies.  In our lethargic Europe 
(and maybe  even in the United States)  we  should do much  more 
to promote  the creative restructuring and  retooling of our 
industry.  The  Japanese challenge will remain unanswered if we 
would  simply keep on  subsidising dying  industries with  short~ 
t  rm  objectives in mind. 
Another  problem area concerns  the.antitrust enforcement in 
crisis-stricken industries.  Some  temporary moderation of  the 
rigours of our rules may  indeed be  necessary,  but only as  a 
corollary to an adequate restructuring of  the industry to 
·-----------.·---· 
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re-establish its viability in a  .competitive climate both 
inside and outside the Common  Market.  ~.ticle 85 "(3)  provides 
the main avenue  in this respect.  If it were  found  to be 
inadequate,  additional rules will have  to be defined.  I  will 
not shy  away  from  that issue either. 
•  And  then our antitrust policy with respect to vertical 
restrictions on  the one  hand  and mergers  and  take-.overs  on . the 
•  other.  These  topics have  been  and still are hotly debated on 
this side of the Atlantic and !.believe that a  remark on  the 
·'  ..  .. 
•  Commission•s  thinking might  inte~est you  • 
The  realisation and maintenance of the unity of the Common 
Market must be given  top priority.  You  w~ll understand,  therefore, 
that most vertical restrictions,  such as grants of territorial 
protection which are tied in with exclusive dealing arrangements 
or with systems  of so-called selective distribution or with 
patent or copyright licenses are  (-unless there are 
exceptional circumstances and here  I  am  thinking of the 
introduction of  a  new  product on  the market,  e.g.  -)  incompatible 
with  the very principle of the establishmentof a  Common  Market. 
The  Commission  does  not believe that absolute territorial pro-
tection.is absolutely necessary in order to permit the 
exclusive patentee or license holder to exploit his exclusive 
•  right efficiently,  given the legitimate interest which  consumers 
have  in obtaining a  fair share of the benefit which results 
'from the exclusive concession or from  the license agreement  • 
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You  should realise .that the Commission is still struggling for 
the abolishment -of  existing national frontiers  and for the 
prevention of new  national barriers from being  erected.  Even 
though  the Commission may  sometimes  look like Don  Quixote 
fighting  the windmills,its position on vertical restrictions 
cannot really be separated from  the structure and-origin of 
the European  Economic  Community. 
With respect to mergers  and  take-overs  the Commission  and the 
Court of Justice have  never  considered that EEC  merger control 
or the control of the behaviour·of corporations which are in 
a  dominant position should exclusively or even principally 
be  judged  by  the absolute size of the corporations concerned. 
Effective competition depends  in fact at the same  time on 
the structure of  the market,  the behaviour of the ptarket 
participants and the reactions of that market.  (Even  the French 
nationalisations are being  examined in this light) •  And  yet,  a 
strong degree of  concentration encourages  the convergency of 
interests when  it comes  to profit maximalisation for the 
leading corporate conglomerate in a  ·given market.  This is why 
the  Commission  has  proposed to the Council of ·l.tinisters, 
which is the legislative body  in the European ·community,  that 
~  e  market  share test only be  used as  a  threshold criterion. 
Only if the corporationsinvolved in a  merger or take-over have 
a  combined market share which is equal to or exceeds that 
threshold,  will it be necessary to verify on  a  case by  case 
basis what  the repercussions of  the concentration will be for 
the competitive situation on the market.  In making  such a 
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verification a  whole  series of other criteria· will be  used, 
such  a-s,  for  example,  the choice which users  and suppliers 
have,  the evolution of offer and  demand  for the products 
concerned,  and  the effects of international competition. 
I.believe that this  pr~gmatic approach to merger  control 
goes  very much  in the same  direction as  the evolution which 
is currently taking place in the United States. 
I  should add,  however,  and ·this brings me  back  to "antitrust 
as  an endangered species"  that it is not yet certain that the 
:!  European Community will obtain an  instrument for controlling  ..  .  . 
• 
mergers  effectively in the near future.  In 1973  a  basic proposal 
was  made  by  the Commission  to the council of Ministers.  It has 
·since then been blocked by  the Council  for various political 
and national reasons,  in spite  of repeated insistence and· 
pressure from  the European Parliament.  In a  hybrid organisation 
such as  the European Community,  the legislative  and decision.·. 
making  process  leaves much  to be desired  (except,  maybe,  for 
those who  hope  to make  the-Guinness  Book  of World  Records  for 
legislative slowness).  I  intend to give a  new  impetus  to  the 
work  on this proposal and put greater political pressure 
behind it than has  been  the case in the intervening years. 
The  same  applies to the recent Commission  proposals for 
regulations  applying  the competition rules to air and  sea 
transport.  These proposals are not - as was·  said in the  IATA 
meeting  two  weeks  ago  ...,  forms  of  "extreme consumerism and 
.poi:itical opportunism".  They  are simply an attempt- and  a 
reasonable one on  top of that - to lay down  detailed provisions 
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for  some  of the last branches of the  e~onomy for which this 
has  not yet been done;  an attempt, ·in other words,  to extend. 
Regulati-on  17  to the two  last economic activities which l-Iere 
not covered by it. So  far,  the council has  not re.acted  very. 
enthusiastically.  And,  if you  have  read_about the great Panda's 
difficulties in multiplying itself,  th~n you will  readi~y 
und~rstand why  I  see this analogy with endangered species  • 
Thank you. 
I 